What does Establishment want?
The most important question about the upcoming elections is not what the political parties want. It is what does the Establishment want.
Syed Talat Hussain
We all know what political parties want from the elections that are set for 8th February. They want to come to power. Why they want to come to power can be answered in different ways depending on your level of trust, anger, and cynicism. But the most important question about the upcoming elections is not what the political parties and their leaders want. It is this: what does the Establishment want from this nerve-shattering, mind-boggling, nauseatingly noisy, deeply controversial, increasingly violent, and terribly wobbly event?
The real intent or the plan of the Establishment remains, to quote Winston Churchill, “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” And this is not because the Establishment is so smart that it keeps its goals so deeply hidden and safely away from the public gaze that we cannot even guess them properly. Quite the contrary. The Establishment is quite predictable and its core aims are fairly simple—that it wants to retain its say in all important policy matters and wishes to have a certain veto power even when a new government is formed after the elections.
And it is the army chief who has told us this by stating clearly in his interface with the youth as to what the politicians can and can not do. But this is not the complete answer nor is it even relevant simply because this is how every Establishment in Pakistan’s political history has seen its role in the scheme of power. This one headed by General Asim Munir is no exception.
The complete answer can only be given if we analyze whether the polls can actually produce a result that allows the Establishment to retain its strategic toehold in the power structure and still leave enough space for a newly-elected government to retain a measure of democratic legitimacy. This is where it gets complicated.
For now, it looks as if all the boxes are ticked for this diarchy to work. The PML-N and the Establishment are two wheels of the cart and the rest of the political forces will be deployed to grease these wheels. The PTI as we have known it under Imran Khan as a political entity will be jettisoned and be replaced with a shadow and a husk of its previous self. And so the country will travel to its promised destination of greatness.
But polls are like battles, where most white-board plans don’t survive the first bullet fired. Unlike battles, electoral outcomes acquire legitimacy not through the final result but through the process, the result is achieved. This election is anything but free of the charge of being free for all. The complex attempt to wrap up the failed Imran Project has left deep scars on the entire electoral process.
The much-deserved and hard-earned downfall that Imran contrived for himself is now lost in an election campaign that is saturated by his stories of victimhood, and, tied to it, sainthood. The barrage of verdicts against him days before the polls has only reinforced his injured-puppy claims. The street is not erupting for him, but his brand is out there in everyone’s faces. You can’t say that the Imran Factor has been subtracted from the equation.
This means that the polls will have to somehow overcome this challenge, which opens the door to possible “non-electoral” ways to achieve the end. PTI losing seats isn’t enough if its vote bank is not dented. Now how do you do that if voters show up for him? And the street remains focused on him even after the polls? How do you do that without creating serious legitimacy questions about the entire exercise?
Next, while the PML-N looks to have overcome its initial inertia and is pulling all the stops in the last leg of the campaign, the party is unlikely to get a free path to power. After all, Nawaz has a past with the Establishment and that will remain a forever impediment to trusting him fully.
So his electoral space has to be staked with “guarantors” (allies, independents, smaller parties, etc) to keep him on a tight leash. That alone can ensure that he forms a government that does not upend the delicate applecart of say Special Investment Facilitation Council. Or even take the front seat in a way that he is prone to doing vis-a-vis the army chief.
This would require some fine balancing act before and after the elections. It would require keeping all the smaller parties in good humor. It would require constant political management. It would also require conceding space to the new government without taking a backseat. These requirements seem impossible—of managing a political system where the street largely remains tied to Imran’s narrative, where electoral power seems to be going to his opponents (who also have to be kept under a keen watch), and where decisive power remains with the Establishment. And this is happening as our borders continue to heat up from all three sides, terrorism is peaking and regional wars are threatening to disrupt aid commitments from friendly Middle Eastern countries.
So, if the Establishment’s hope/aim/goal/desire—I am only guessing—is to keep Pakistan stable, neutralize political mayhem, and implement its “co-sharing power plan” then the winds are not blowing in that direction. The skies look dark as if a storm is coming our way. So hold tight.