Pakistan's future 4: Hybrid-plus pro-max

Just like martial rule is a default political option for the Establishment, hybrid-plus is their default strategic notion. Every time the country spins on its tale, they reach out for it notionally.

When Fitch, the global ratings agency, released its report on Pakistan a few days back, much of the national interest in its political content focused on two aspects. One, the forecast that Imran Khan would stay in jail for the foreseeable future. Two, the suggestion that the PML-N-led government will remain in power over the coming 18 months.

The PTI wailed over this projection, milking it to feed its ongoing campaign of political persecution. Government ministers got into top gear, asserting they were here to stay for five years, no less. The next sentence in the Fitch assessment didn’t get much traction. “In the unlikely event that the government is replaced, the most likely alternative is a military-backed technocratic administration rather than fresh election.”

These 22 words sum up the decades-long quest of the Establishment to find an elixir for whatever ails Pakistan bypassing politics, which, in their consistent view, is incapable of securing the national interest (yes, that term). This notion, which Fitch has picked up as a likely scenario in case the Shehbaz government folds up, is the proverbial holy grail. Powerful generals adore it. A diverse but mighty lobby promotes it even when elected governments are in power.

Commonsensically seen, this is a wild goose chase. But nonsensically cherished, this notion is the soul of the hybrid-plus system. On paper it reads like this: a neat governance arrangement of able people enabled by the Establishment, shorn of political wrangling, sharply focused on social development, quick reform in all sectors, and a turbo-paced economic performance. A clarification. This fairy-tale setup should not be confused with efforts to raise a new crop of leaders that all strong men have attempted. Ayub Khan’s basic democrats, Ziaul Haq’s party-less polls, and ethnicization and Talibanisation of politics, Musharraf’s launch of a full brigade of johnny-uncles-aunties-come-latelys. These were all fabrications to foist a new class of politicians upon the existing ones.

The hybrid-plus system is different. It looks for even shorter shortcuts. It is a hunt for quick-fixers, problem-solvers, project managers, game-changers, and so-called experts, who could use their experience and skills to unleash waves of Newtonian wisdom to alter the messed-up universe of Pakistan. The likes of Moeen Qureshi, the ex-caretaker Prime Minister and his cabinet. Or that conceited con-man, Shaukat Aziz, who spent more time preening himself before PM House mirrors than doing work; or the present finance minister, whose banking career somehow has made him an economist. The notion runs deep that Pakistan can be sorted out with experts combined with the army’s organizational strength and the barrel power it commands. Beyond clueless, incompetent and corrupt politicians this tag team of generals and technocrats can offer Pakistanis a Roosevelt-like New Deal. Just like martial rule is a default political option for the Establishment, hybrid-plus is their default strategic notion. Every time the country spins on its tale, they reach out for it notionally.

The most prominent example of this system’s downgraded version was the Imran Khan government. The name tag was not hybrid. It was called One Page to make it look more politically civilized. The problem with One Page, however, was that the “experts” bit of the system didn’t quite work. The system's only experts were Gogi, Bushra, Zulfi, Maneka, Riaz, and Azam led by Imran. Most of them were good-for-nothing snake oil sellers and pocketers of everything that came their way.

The Imran One Page failure did not lead to an abandonment of the love for the hybrid system. A hybrid-plus pro-max was introduced during the caretaker set-up when a cabinet of all talents was created and the lead role was given to a smart-talking, me-knows-everything PM. All provinces got smaller versions of hybrid-plus. This system got extended because of the “peculiar facts and circumstances of the 2024 elections”, to borrow a peculiar phrase from the 8-judges’ decision on reserved seats. Believe it when I say it, the Establishment thinks that this experiment did very well. That it had cohesion, direction, command flow, and focused aims. It was a far cry from the broken, piecemeal, headache-inducing arrangement in place at present that requires endless firefighting.

But because of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present political situation (to modify the good old sentence) it is not a good idea to re-write this “partially-elected, not fully-selected” chaotic arrangement. But if they have to rewrite it---and this is where Fitch is correct---it would be an upgraded version of the caretaker set-up.

Who would join in? Oh, you have no idea how many would suck up, kick down, die, and kill to get on board. Legions of wannabes infest our land. (The most concentrated form of the infestation per square km is in Islamabad, followed by Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, and many foreign countries.) Retired bureaucrats who have nothing to do in their lives; businessmen who benefit directly from shaping policy according to their profit motives; ego-centric technocrats unrecognized even by immediate neighbors but with undying dreams of playing national heroes; old rag-tag army of haggard human resource that has served all manner of governments and refuses to disappear; discarded politicians; posers with pens; chameleons with cameras; and of course members of a cannibalistic elite that has fattened itself on the state’s gravy train. Their sons, sons-in-law, daughters, grandchildren, and relatives with paper degrees from foreign universities and no commitment to this land except to add a designation to their CVs. They are all out there goading the Establishment to never forget the hybrid-plus system’s great benefits and implement it as soon as it gets rid of these wretched politicians. The campaign is truly intense.

The Establishment, in a given situation, can take another walk in this Lalaland of political loafers and bounty hunters because it is wedded to the notion that Pakistan can be managed from a command center with the help of non-elected star performers. This can be Pakistan’s fourth future. But there is a fifth one too. On a 1-to-10 scale of excitement, that one would probably score 9.