Pakistan's future 3: Martial rule
The army sees itself, more now than ever, as the last of the Mohicans, the Hawkeye, whose fall would put Pakistan under the deluge of conspirators and vultures, picking on its bones...
In a country that has spent nearly half of its existence under direct military rule and the rest of the half alternating between hybrid regimes and rickety civilian set-ups, it is counter-intuitive to ask whether the generals taking over again is a possibility. It always is a possibility. More than that, it is the default option, a pre-set course of action wired into the system’s settings.
From what we know for now, no military take-over is on the horizon. Even milder version with a veneer of constitutionality, like imposing emergency, are ruled out by military sources. I have not heard anyone in the military high command circles even mention martial rule as a plan. But considering our past and the combination of factors that are coming together, never say never. What can precipitate an army takeover?
The most obvious answer is a Bangladesh and Kenya like situations combined. Bottled up political frustration built during elections, culminating in youth-driven street agitation and clashes over job quotas; raised taxes and public anger over protestors’ killing, triggering a series of unfortunate events. This is the summary of the two countries’ agitational situation. Pakistan has witnessed things spinning out of control in the AJK where mobs ruled the streets for days and it looked to erupt and be copycatted elsewhere in the mainland. For now, we have an uneasy lid on public anger over backbreaking taxes, job losses, the tales of political wrongs told by the PTI and a pervasive sense of dismay. Recently, attempts have been made to harness this molten lava and make it flow. In the district of Bannu; at Islamabad’s doorstep. The peace march in Bannu wasn’t about peace; neither was it peaceful. The TLP’s siege of the capital showed once again what a group can do to Pakistan’s jugular vein.
Most big events start small. Wildfires are caused by a spark. Pakistan is a tinderbox. The potential sources of public violence simmer even in the best governed societies. Here, too, things can go haywire at a large scale, especially if terrorism, fanaticism, and weaponization of politics continues. If that happens, brace for military’s direct impact. The khakis will step in if a major destabilizing effort is mounted, melting away the normal administrative response from the civilian setup which is inadequate even in the mildest of circumstances.
The other trigger of a takeover can come from a head-on collision between politicized judges and the Establishment’s effort to stem and scuttle their declared political intent. So far there is much sparring and pushing and shoving in a complex huddle; but it is only a matter of time that punches start to land where it really hurts. You only need to hear Justice Athar Minallah’s claim in New York to know which way some of the men in robes are swinging. The Establishment sees in all of this a “bigger agenda.” “Tip of a very large iceberg”, I have been told. The nature of the iceberg has been explained. But, generally, security masters always worry about “elaborate designs” to make Pakistan a soft state, and then be forced to dismantle its nukes. When they hear Lord Hamilton in the UK, Brad Sherman in the US, Justice Minallah in New York, Imran Khan in Adiala Jail say the same thing to the extent of singing in unison, their antennas go up and gloves come off. And if this sense deepens—and it is deepening with each passing day—that the Imran case is being used to excavate a tunnel under their feet, they will attempt to crush the hole diggers, regardless of who they are and what their position is.
The civilian government of Shehbaz Sharif so far has stood on this side of the argument, but it is not putting its best foot forward in combating incessant propaganda against the army and ISI, which the Army sees as a well-oiled attempt to hollow out the country. The government’s media managers are weak, clueless and there is hardly a credible face speaking with force in an age where jaw-strength matters more than cereberal acuity. Most important Nawaz Sharif does not want to take ownership of the counter-punch. This scene has forced the generally-circumspect and cautious office of the Director General of ISPR to commit to making more media appearances. This is partially to meet the “perspective deficit” that should have been filled by the civilian government on issues that the Establishment believes are central to Pakistan’s existence.
They think they are in the middle of a real battle; the government acts as if this is a side-show. If this disconnect continues and terrorism, anti-Pakistan campaigns, army-bashing, and the moves to get the country sanctioned combines with agitational politics and protests at a large scale, and if the civilian set-up is perceived by the generals as too clumsy, tentative and limp-wristed, a radical departure from the constitutional rule and another relapse into extra-constitutionalism of an aggressive variety can’t be ruled out.
The army sees itself, more now than ever, as the last of the Mohicans, the Hawkeye, whose fall would put Pakistan under the deluge of conspirators and vultures, picking on its bones after ripping its skin off. (Yes, their worldview of the worst-case scenario is actually this graphic.) This is an institutional position. Everything else is secondary and subject to this view and the role they think the army has to play in national life. You don’t have to agree to this role and view to figure out how this would come into play if the army is put in a position where it has to rely on its own power to battle it out. They will take over. Period. That’s a future we pray does not come, but if it does, it won’t go away soon.
However, miliary takeovers are hugely problematic. Without international endorsement, the strategic weight Pakistan enjoyed in the past, and an economy and society on the edge, shooting from the hip could backfire. There will be un-resolvable questions of legitimacy, efficacy , efficiency and sustainability against a domestic political backlash from the legal, political, and civil society combined resistance. Managing chaos can lead to more chaos. Can there be another way? Yet another future? There is. Call it hybrid plus.