Pakistan’s future 2: The system survives

From where things stand today, the idea of stabilizing Pakistan and permanently detoxicating it of its chronic challenges can actually materialize.

From where things stand today, the idea of stabilizing Pakistan and permanently detoxicating it of its chronic challenges can actually materialize. Or so the Shehbaz government and its backbone, the Establishment’s support, believe. Part of the belief stems from incumbency: there is a government in place at the center; five out of six federating units are on one page with federal policies. The sixth, KP, is hollow talk but nothing that can’t be managed. This power is firmly established and stamped by the Establishment. So firmly that inspite of relentless domestic and international campaign on human rights issues not even a low-grade clerk, much less a high-ranking officer, has been replaced. This symbolism of turning a deaf ear to howls of persecution is a deliberate message that power breeds more power and nothing would change this equation. If the message wasn’t loud enough, then the arrest of Rauf Hasan from the PTI’s secretariat should be truly audible.

The opponents of the present system, PTI included, are pretty spineless. They neither have the guts to make the streets bloody nor have the organizational cohesion to make their demands count. The PTI is a house divided and led by compromised men. Madam Bushra spends more time spewing poison against Aleema and “her touts in the party” (her words not mine) than against her tormentors. Imran while commands absolute authority from jail has absolutely no idea how to manage this steady atomization within a party, whose members’ interests are in working the system rather than wrecking it. That’s why Barrister Gohar and others were quick to dispel the impression created by their strange bedfellow, the JUI, that they are discussing dissolution of the KP assembly. They want to stay with the system. No revolutions ever taken place from the houses with privileged members sit licking their paws and thanking their starts for having made it to the seat. So a mass uprising is out. A Takseem Square is out. If those are out, the government isn’t going to be ousted. It will continue.

That leaves the issue of politicians in robes, from the government’s point of view, the judges. Bend your ear to what chief minister Punjab has recently said about dealing with destabilizers of the system “with iron hands”. She did not say constitutional hands. She ripped the 8th-judges judgement apart and emphatically suggested that a particular party’s facilitators (read her lips) are on the radar of the “people’s reaction.” Empty rhetoric? Not quite. She spoke a language and in an idiom that was well-rehearsed and delivered, in the words of an informed source “immaculately.” The judges that the PTI is counting on would react. Contempt of court is their weapon of choice. And of compulsion. That's about all they can do. The problem with acting revolutionary on the side the PTI is that they all, from the Islamabad High Court to the high rise building that is the Supreme Court, get tagged. They get tagged as facilitators of 9th May rioters; defenders of those vying to get Pakistan sanctioned and relief-givers to those whose most notorious public introductions are Farah fraud Gogi and Malik Riaz. That taints them. This makes them a party. This can sap any court’s moral authority. And finally, judges cannot take on the federal cabinet, the provincial cabinets, the federal and provincial governments, the parliament, the Election Commission, the Army, the ISI, the FIA, the IB and the rest. They are not Castros fighting Batistas. There is no Cuban revolution here. This is not the July of 1953. At best there is incubated anger and a desire for more space and some media heroism that may come with it. At worst, there are some very personal agendas at work. They cannot go beyond a certain line to alter the political system from within and still retain their status as neutral interpreters of the constitution. So like the PTI, they too are the system’s stakeholders. Stakeholders hold their stakes. They don’t put them at stake. That’s where the government draws its core comfort from.

The most important reason this system could continue and increase its longevity is the economy. If you get the economy right, the balloon of desperation that flies PTI’s propaganda high enough for everyone to see will burst. So whats happening on the economic front to engender hope that the system can survive, expand and conversely shrivel its shrieking opponents? Apparently not much. Yea, apparently, say government sources exuding confidence. Look a little closer at stats to reconsider what is apparent. They draw an interesting comparison of the Imran years and the much-blasted post Imran time.

• Exports: FY 2021-22: $26.8 billion; FY 2023-24 $30.64 billion.

• IT Exports FY 2021-22: $1.9 billion; FY 2023-24, $3.223 billion.

• Imports: FY 2021-22: $59.8 billion; FY 2023-24, $54.73 billion.

• Trade deficit: FY 2021-22, $48.259 billion; FY 2023-24, $21.73 billion.

• Current Account Deficit: FY 2021-22, $17.4 billion, FY 2023-24, $0.6 billion.

• Fiscal deficit: FY 2021-22, 6.3% of GDP; FY 2023-24, 7.1% of GDP.

• Foreign Exchange Reserves: FY 2021-22: $9.19 billion; FY 2023-24 $14.7 billion.

• FBR Tax Collection: FY 2021-22: Rs 5,349 trillion; FY 2023-24, Rs 9.306 trillion.

• Roshan Digital Account (RDA) Inflows: FY 2021-22, $4.606 billion; FY 2023-24, $8.055 billion.

• Inflation Rate: FY 2021-22: 19.87%; FY 2023-24, 11.8%.

• KSE-100 Index: FY 2021-22: Declined from 47,356 points to 44,929 points; FY 2023-24, increased to 80,672 points.

• Pharmaceutical Sector Growth: FY 2021-22 14.3%, FY 2023-24 ,23.2%.

• Agricultural Growth: FY 2021-22: 4.4%; FY 2023-24 6.4%.

• Wheat Production: FY 2021-22: 26.4 million tonnes; FY 2023-24, 31.4 million tonnes.

• Cotton Production: FY 2021-22: 8.329 million bales; FY 2023-24; 10.2 million bales.

• Rice Production: FY 2021-22, 8.9 million tonnes; FY 2023-24, 9.9 million tonnes.

• Maize Production:FY 2021-22, 9.5 million tonnes; FY 2023-24: 9.8 million tonnes.

Apologies for too much data, but understand the source of the government’s confidence here. These stats show that the “all is lost” mantra is not grounded in total facts. More important, each sector doing better than before creates its own beneficiaries who want to continue the trajectory of their success. They don’t want disruption. The more the economy performs the fewer the supporters of mayhem, and the weaker Imran’s propaganda appeal.

This does not solve the problem of the government’s dipping public ratings; nor does it detract from anemic economic growth and deep structural issues that the country’s economic policy planning is stuck in. Let’s us not kid anyone. The economy is a far cry from taking off. But it does suggest that the economic cataclysm that chaos-makers thrive on and naysayers peddle could be some distance away allowing the government to stay in power and build on these numbers.

If the next six months could see more investment flows and development schemes penetrate the lower end of a distressed public, this system could become firmer, Imran’s jail duration become longer, and the stakeholders of the system, the judges, become soberer. Two years down the line a slightly early election could then defuse residual tensions and if the PML-N gets Punjab development right, it might shake an internally conflicted and outwardly battered PTI. Meanwhile, the PTI has set itself up for a ban. Its noxious propaganda, its vicious attacks on the army and its digital storm-troopers are edging it close to the precipice. As it struggles to survive, the government makes strides in strengthening itself. This a possibility. But what if the political conflict does not get resolved easily? What if chaos expands? Then there is the third future: nasty, brutish, and long.